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Abstract
An Enterprise Architecture (EA) provides a holis-
tic view of an enterprise. In creating or changing an
EA, multiple decisions have to be made, which are
based on assumptions about the situation at hand.
In this thesis, we develop a framework for rea-
soning about changing decisions and assumptions,
based on logical theories of intentions. This frame-
work serves as the underlying formalism for a rec-
ommender system for EA decision making.
1 Introduction
Modern day enterprises face many challenges, such as
changes in the economic climate, mergers, acquisitions, busi-
ness models, deregulation of international trade, etc. These
changes are fueled even more by the advances of eCommerce,
Networked Business, etc. [Tapscott, 1996]. For senior man-
agement of an enterprise it is important to steer/direct enter-
prise transformations. Enterprise architecture is considered
to provide such a mechanism. It is usually defined as: “those
properties of an enterprise that are necessary and sufficient to
meet its essential requirements”.
In creating or changing an enterprise architecture, multi-
ple decision have to be made. These decisions are to a large
extent based on assumptions about the situation at hand (the
environment, the strategic direction of the enterprise, goals
of the stakeholders, etc.). In practice, organizations are con-
fronted with frequent changes and challenges to these as-
sumptions. The aim of this thesis is to develop a logical
framework for EA decision making as a basis for a recom-
mender system.
Since it is inherently difficult to plan architectural design,
the planning theory used should be able to represent ab-
stract and ambiguous plans, alternative and back-up plans,
and mechanisms for the revision of plans. In particular, clas-
sical planning techniques are often not sufficient, and have
therefore been extended with the theory of intentions.
Intention commitment and revision strategies originate
from the philosophical theory of action, and were introduced
in the mid eighties in planning theory to reason about plan
revision [Cohen and Levesque, 1990], and over the past two
decades the theory has been subsequently improved and sim-
plified [Lorini and Herzig, 2008] and applied to, for exam-
ple, agent based software engineering. It has been called the
belief-desire-intention or BDI theory.
Our central research question is as follows:
How can logical theories of intention from Knowl-
edge Representation be extended with change over
time and uncertainty, so they can serve as an un-
derlying formalism for a Recommender System for
high-level decision-making?
This break down into the following sub-questions:
1. We assume that it is important to reason about changing
intentions in time in high-level decision making in enter-
prises. How can existing theories intentions be extended
to support change in time in such decision making?
2. We assume that it is important to reason about (qual-
itative and quantitative) uncertainty in high-level deci-
sion making. How should the extended logical theory
of question (1) be extended to support different types of
uncertainty?
3. How to implement the resulting logical theory of ques-
tion (2)? In other words, what is its computational com-
plexity?
2 The Recommender Perspective
Shoham recently changed the focus on intentions from its
historical philosophical perspective to a computer science
database perspective of revising plans in the context of be-
liefs [Shoham, 2009]. We therefore use Shoham’s proposal
of revising plans in the context of beliefs as the starting point
for our methodology, and coin it the recommender perspec-
tive, where the beliefs represent the assumptions of the plans
(see Figure 1).
Figure 1: The Recommender Perspective
The recommender system consists of a belief-intention
database, capturing specific interactions between beliefs and
intentions. The database is used by a (human) planner that is
engaged in some form of practical reasoning and stores its
intentions and beliefs respectively in an intention database
and a belief database. Besides the standard functionality of
storage and retrieval, the belief and intention databases sat-
isfy the following three consistency conditions: First, the be-
lief database is internally consistent. Secondly, the intention
database is internally consistent. Thirdly, the belief database
and the intention database are mutually consistent.
2.1 The Logic
In a recent publication [van Zee et al., 2015a], we develop a
logic for the recommender system. Since we would like to be
able to reason about changing beliefs and intentions, it is our
aim to develop a logic about action and time, such that this
logic can be used within a more general framework of belief
revision. It is this constraint of using the logic within a belief
revision setting that drives the design of the logic. There-
fore, since belief revision is originally defined for proposi-
tional logic, it is our methodology to stay as close to propo-
sitional logic as possible. The logic we develop is called
Parameterized-time Action Logic. The language of this logic
contains formulas to reason about preconditions, postcondi-
tions, and the execution of actions. Atoms in the language
are parameterized with the state at which they are true. The
language of the logic is generated from the following BNF
grammar:
ϕ ::= pt | pre(a)t | post(a)t | do(a)t |tϕ | ϕ∧ϕ | ¬ϕ
The logic bears close similarity to a logic proposed by Icard
et al. [Icard et al., 2010]. However, we show in the same
publication that there is no finitary sound and complete ax-
iomatization for their syntax and semantics. We provide an
axiomatization for our logic and prove that it is sound and
strongly complete with respect to a tree semantics.
2.2 AGM Revision
In a paper published in these proceedings [van Zee et al.,
2015b], we provide AGM postulates for belief revision in
the logic of the previous section. Moreover, we show that
we can obtain the Katsuno-Mendelzon representation theo-
rem [1991] by restricting the logic to formulas representing
beliefs up to a certain time. Finally, we show that we can
express the Darwiche-Pearl postulates [1997] for iterated re-
vision in our logic, and we can obtain their representation
theorem as well.
2.3 Coherence between Beliefs and Intentions
The previous two sections describe a logic for revision of the
belief database. In a future paper, we extend this framework
with intentions, which are formalized as pairs of the form
(a, t), denoting that action a is intended at time t. We then for-
malize Shoham’s coherence conditions between beliefs and
intentions in our logic:
1. At most one action can be intended for any given
2. If you intend to take an action, you believe that its post-
conditions hold.
3. If you intend to take an action you cannot believe that its
preconditions do not hold.
Based on these conditions, we study the revision of beliefs
and intentions.
3 Future Work
Shoham emphasizes that his model has to be extended in a
variety of ways, and for our application the extension with
(both qualitative and quantitative) uncertainty is the next step.
Following that, we study the computational complexity of the
framework. In parallel, we explore whether the Enterprise Ar-
chitecture community can benefit from our approach as well.
We made a first attempt in a publication where we developed
a naive first-order logic formalisation of an existing frame-
work for decision capturing in Enterprise Architecture [van
Zee et al., 2014].
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